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CONSIDERING  THE  COSTS AND  BENEFITS  OF
LAWYERING  IN  DRAFTING LEGISLATION  OR
ESTABLISHING  PRECEDENTS
PHILIP B.  HEYMANN*
I.  INTRODUCTION
M  ANY  people in the United States and abroad believe that we
are an overly lawyered country.  Of course, deciding to buy a
lawyer's  services  for planning  or counselling  is  a  free choice  by
private parties, and we  generally assume  that expenditures  made
in this way accurately  reflect  the only relevant preferences:  those
of the purchaser.  Moreover,  the  market  for legal  services  is  de-
cently competitive.  The problem then must be in the way we have
organized  our  society,  creating  systems  that  require  expensive
legal help for private individuals.  But if there are ways of writing
laws that require less lawyering, why  don't we use them?  That is
the subject I  will explore.
The  situation  is a  bit more complicated  when  we talk about
the  resolution  of disputes  about  facts  or law.  All  litigation  is  a
mistake in hindsight-in the sense that, if both parties had known
what the judgment would be, they (although not necessarily their
lawyers!)  would have preferred  settlement at something like that
figure  to bearing  the costs of litigation  to get there.  But what in
the  drafting  of a  law  makes  such  mistakes  more likely,  and  why
don't we act more effectively  to minimize  the possibility  of their
occurring?  That too is  the  subject of this comment.
Of course  the  final judgment  is  not a  fact  that  only awaits
discovery,  like  the  weather  in  Chicago  on  the  date  of our  next
presidential  election  or the composition  of Mars.  It is produced
by  the  activity  of parties  and  their advocates.  The  fact  that  the
final judgment is  not just "found,"  but  is "created"  as  well,  also
produces  costs the  parties would  rather not bear.  The explana-
tion  is  straightforward.  Since  the  results  of  litigation  depend
upon how  much  skill  and  effort  are  devoted  to  persuasion-as
well as upon the rightness of one's cause-each  side has an incen-
tive to invest in persuasion more heavily than its opponent.  The
resulting "arms  race"  is costly.  (See  APPENDIX  A.)  So I am  also
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concerned  to analyze what it is we do as a society that encourages
competitive  investment in persuasion  when there  is litigation.
My  subject is simply  this:  what is it that we are buying when
we create  the conditions  that demand lawyers?  The terms of the
trade are not obvious when  we make the  governmental  decisions
about  substantive  law  that create  these  conditions.  Only if they
become  obvious  is it possible  to choose meaningfully.
A.  An Initial Caution
Before  proceeding,  it  is  important  to  see  an essential  issue
that is not central  to what follows.  In looking for the real choices
confronting lawmakers that affect the demand for legal services, I
am assuming that, if recognized,  they would be addressed, and, if
addressed,  resolved in  such  a way  as  to passibly  reflect  popular
wishes.  But this ignores very serious questions about political ac-
tors'  will to address these  questions.  Lawyers play an important
role in  much  of the  legislation with which  we will be concerned.
Yet the interests  of lawyers  may not coincide with those of other
segments of the population.  I  have a friend who explains  unnec-
essary  obscurity  and  complexity  in  the  law  by noting  that  if the
law required  all transactions of a certain type to be carried out in
ancient  Greek  and  if there  were  a  number of people  trained  in
Greek  to  handle  those  transactions,  these  people  would  fight
mightily  to prevent  a reform that allowed  work in  everyday  Eng-
lish.  Certainly major segments  of the bar have  fought in just this
way  to  prevent  any  effective  form  of  no-fault  automobile
insurance.
A  socialization  in  certain  specialized  values  may be an  even
more  important  form  of demand-creating  influence  by  lawyers.
American  lawyers  are taught certain values,  among them:  an ad-
versary process;  the fullest and fairest hearings;  the most refined
set of rules;  a tradition that no harm flowing from another's fault
should go uncompensated;  the most encompassing standards  for
determining  fault;  and  a  process  of appellate  review.  Lawyers
learn to  value highly partisan representation, to  suspect any final
resolution  of a controversy  that  is not judicial,  and, above all,  to
believe  in the right to counsel and the importance  of legal coun-
sel.  As judges or legislators, as advocates or lobbyists, they bring
these values,  which they hold far more than others do, to bear on
the process  of lawmaking.
Procedures  that are too "lawyer intensive"  are not simply the
result of lawyers'  self interest, their socialization  in  these values,
[Vol. 36: p.  191
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or even popular belief in the importance of the same values.  The
politics that creates  an excessive demand for lawyers also includes
a calculating use of law and procedure by those who benefit from
the barriers  that these  can impose to any challenge  to their posi-
tion.  Any  "interest,"  from low income tenants to major polluting
industries, that sees itself as far more likely to be a defendant than
a plaintiff in a particular form of transaction may lobby or litigate
for additional  process or a fuller range of counterclaims  and de-
fenses as a way of discouraging and delaying, if not defeating, ac-
tions  against  it.  Complex  and  formal  procedures  help  a
defendant  who is represented  by  counsel.
Thus, in focusing on ultimate social trade-offs or choices that
determine  the demand  for lawyers,  I am setting aside important
factors that may shape  the very process of choosing, particularly
the self interest  and the effective biases  of lawyers  and clients.
II.  THE MARKET  DEMAND  FOR  LAWYERS'  SERVICES
A.  The Product
What is the product that private (or, analogously,  public) cli-
ents buy when they pay for legal services?  Private lawyers serve a
half-dozen functions  that are valuable to private parties  as well as
important to the  society as  a whole.
- They tell private parties what they must do to comply
with, or avoid difficulties  from, the law (and what they
needn't do).
- They help a client keep the actions of others  (govern-
mental or private  parties) within  the bounds of their
obligations  and  duties  and  to  obtain  recompense  if
the actions of others depart from their obligations  to
the client's  harm.
- They  defend  private parties  from  legal  claims  made
by governmental  or other private parties.
- They help in the exercise of obligation-creating pow-
ers delegated  to individuals  or organizations  by con-
tract, property,  trust, estate,  corporate,  partnership,
or other areas of law.
- They represent parties, groups, and interests in seek-
ing modifications  of the law from courts, legislatures,
and regulatory bodies.
- In  a  miscellaneous  collection  of situations,  lawyers
help satisfy the conditions  for obtaining governmen-
1991]
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tal  benefits,  licenses,  permits,  or  changes  of status,
ranging across  a very broad area from the pursuit of a
major government contract or broadcast license to an
uncontested  divorce.
Recognizing that private individuals  often need help in relat-
ing themselves  to the  political/legal  processes of creating,  com-
plying  with,  and  enforcing  expectations  (and  in  resisting
unwarranted  claims),  we  still  must ask why  and when  do people
turn to lawyers  for these  purposes.  Why  should  the  help  come
from someone charging for three years  of legal education  and a
certificate that she passed the bar exam?
For some of these functions, and in some contexts, it needn't.
Insurance  company adjusters and management  or union officials
handle  hundreds  of  thousands  of  accident  claims  and  worker
grievances.  The most notable developments  in some of the most
important  areas  of legal  needs  of individuals  (wills,  real  estate
transactions, divorce, consumer matters) involve shifts away from
the use of lawyers, even  as  the number of lawyers  grows and  the
cost  is  reduced  by  new  forms  of organization  and  delivery.  But
for many novel  or complex  transactions,  private  individuals  and,
more often, businesses either must or sensibly will turn to lawyers
for help.
B.  The Ingredients
We have looked at the product clients buy.  Now consider the
ingredients.  What  skills  and  services  is  a  private  client  buying
when he wants  help in any of the situations where  his relation to
law  and  its  enforcement  is  in  question?  These  include
prominently:
- Knowing  or being  able  to find what  the  law says  an
individual,  organization,  or  governmental  unit  may,
must, or may not do.
- Handling  the  procedures  in  courts,  agencies,  and
legislatures.
- Planning  (foreseeing contingencies  in  a relationship)
and  drafting (dealing with  them clearly  in writing).
- Marshalling  relevant historical  facts.
- Making  persuasive  arguments  about  rules,  powers
and historical  purposes.
- Negotiating.
[Vol.  36: p.  191
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What  advantages  do  lawyers  have  in  furnishing  a  product
made of these  skills and  services?  Law school and  experience  in
practice  develop all  these  skills.  But lawyers  enjoy  or seize addi-
tional advantages.  The  law restricts the freedom of non-lawyers
to sell the first two  services.  The third-planning  and drafting-
often  involves  tax and regulatory  consequences  of sufficient  im-
portance  to  make  it  essential  to  have,  as  an  active  participant,
someone  legally trained.
C.  The Market
An  overwhelming  portion  of our non-governmental  lawyer-
ing is simply purchased  on the market.  This means that a lawyer
generally provides one of these skills or services and serves one of
the private and social functions just described  only under certain
scarce conditions.  An individual must realize that, in the particu-
lar situation  or transaction,  the  law offers,  requires  or threatens
something relevant  to her well-being  (a condition  that may  itself
require  some  minimal  access  to lawyers  or those  in  contact with
lawyers).  Two  additional conditions  must be met.  First,  the dif-
ference between  the  expected  results  with and  without  a  lawyer
(the stakes)  must appear to exceed  the likely attorney's fee.  Sec-
ond,  either  the  client or  her  supporters  or  the  lawyer  must  be
willing and  financially  able  to make  the  investment of (take  the
chance  of losing) the  fee  and costs in  the  hopes of realizing  the
stakes.
We can be more specific about the nature of the demands for
lawyers  for counselling  and  for partisan  help  in  dispute  resolu-
tion, and this will prove useful  as  the argument proceeds.
D.  Counselling
A client  will pay  a lawyer  for counselling  services  when  the
reduction  in  uncertainty  about  legal  consequences  is  worth  the
price charged for the lawyer's  advice.  A private party considering
several  alternative paths can see  that one path has certain risks of
criminal prosecution  or civil litigation with attendant costs to rep-
utation, energy and funds.  Or, one action may be desirable if, but
only if, there is  a way  to feel  secure  as  to how other parties  will
behave  or relate  to  a proposed enterprise  over time.  There may
or may not be subsidies  or tax  benefits, regulatory  requirements
or  tax obligations,  associated  with various paths.  The  client  can
see  that  the  path  she  should  choose  may  depend  on  the  legal
risks, costs and benefits  associated with each alternative.  Even if
1991]
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she can guess some of the probabilities and anticipate some of the
possible results,  it  is very  often worth  the cost  of a lawyer  to get
better  estimates of each of these.
E.  Partisan  Help in Dispute Resolution
The narrowest view of the market  for services in dispute res-
olution  is even  more  familiar.  Any potential  plaintiff knows  that
the total benefit to her will be only the expected value of the judg-
ment  less  the  costs  of her attorney's  fees  and  less  the  burdens
imposed on her by litigation and by disruption of the relationship
with the defendant.  The defendant  knows that he will have to pay
the expected value of the judgment plus his attorney's fees as well
as bear the burdens of litigation and the damage  to whatever rela-
tionship  there was  with the  plaintiff.  As  a first approximation-
i.e., ignoring the "arms  race"  possibility described in the Appen-
dix-it is fair to  say that there will be a demand for lawyers'  serv-
ices whenever  the increase in the expected value of the judgment
(either by an increased  chance  of winning or by a  change in  the
likely remedy) exceeds the costs of the lawyer's services.  It is only
necessary  to add at this stage that much more than a single judg-
ment may be at stake for either party to a dispute.  The most im-
portant stake may be a change in the law or a message  sent about
litigating  strategy or the effects  on actions others  take in light  of
the prospects  of future litigation.
At  the very  core of the  demand for  partisan help  in dispute
resolution  lies  the production  function  of persuasion of a judge
or jury or legislature  in an adversary system.  In many situations,
over a broad range of investment, each party may enjoy a substan-
tial payoff in  persuasiveness  from  the  investment  of time,  effort
and  skill  in  discovering  and  marshalling  facts,  handling  argu-
ments  about  expectations  and  powers,  and  more general  articu-
lateness.  This is inherent in the very nature of persuasive factual,
normative and legal argument about matters of fairness, expecta-
tions or desirable  social policies.
We now use lawyers  to make these arguments  in judicial set-
tings, giving them a monopoly there.  But even if others were sub-
stituted, the stakes of parties in winning disputes before courts or
agencies  and in persuading  lawmakers  would sometimes  warrant
recourse  to highly  expensive  efforts  to produce  persuasiveness.
That  is  simply  a  matter  of the relationship  between  the  stake  a
party  has  in  success  in  persuading  and  the benefits  that  result
from increased  efforts  to make  a persuasive case.
[Vol. 36: p.  191
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III.  THE  SOCIAL  FORCES,  SOME  USING  LAW  AND  OTHERS  NOT,
THAT  DEFINE,  ENFORCE,  OR  LIMIT  SOCIAL
EXPECTATIONS
Let us  now  turn to  choices  about the  substantive  law which
substantially  affect the demand for lawyers'  services.  What is the
context  for  these  crucial,  demand-defining  political  decisions?
Every society  requires for its members  some substantial  measure
of stable  expectations  as  to what  other people  and  institutions
must, may and may not do.  Defining and enforcing  such expecta-
tions are two central roles of law, courts and lawyers.  But choices
about law made  by courts or political institutions are only one of
the  societal  devices  for  creating  and  enforcing  stable
expectations.
The necessary  background  for understanding when a society
chooses the costly path of using lawyers  and legal institutions is a
recognition  of the  alternative  sources  of social  expectations  and
their enforcement.  Legal  institutions  play a supplementary  role,
not the lead,  in performing  these crucial  societal functions.
A.  Defining Social Expectations
There are a number of powerful social forces creating  expecta-
tions.  For one, normative expectations  about everything  from the
way  I  dress  to who  is  entitled  to  my respect  and  deference  are
created and defined by tradition and custom without need of help
from  law.  To  take  another,  organizations  to which  I  "belong"
create  worlds of normative  expectations,  particularly  in  the form
of roles.  For example, much of my daily life  takes shape around
the demands of a work environment created by private individuals
or institutions  that government  and law have simply empowered
with  the  control  of property.  My  normative  expectations  about
the  goods  and  services  I  acquire  and  consume  are  created  by a
market economy as well as by the laws  that protect it.  My expec-
tations about a whole set of long-term relationships characterized
by  mutual dependence-i.e.,  by  a shared recognition of the costs
to  each  of withdrawal-are  partly  customary  or  even  legal  but
largely mutually  defined  by the  participants  over time.
Considering  this  complex  as a  whole, government  and poli-
tics-carried out by elected officials, courts and bureaucrats-play
a  relatively  small  part in  the creation  of normative  expectations.
Our government creates  or defines expectations  in  three primary
ways.  First, courts,  elected officials  or bureaucrats  directly create
1991]
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or recognize duties of private parties-what they must or may not
do.  Second, government  empowers private individuals  and orga-
nizations with what they need  to create additional  expectations-
by recognizing their freedom to choose much of what they do, by
granting them substantial control of the use of various scarce  re-
sources, and by guaranteeing performance of agreements  by indi-
viduals to sacrifice some of this freedom or some of this control of
resources in order to accomplish cooperative undertakings by act-
ing in predictable ways.  Third, government  uses law to define the
scope  of governmental  authority  itself-to  authorize  and  limit
both  the  authority  to  create  private  duties  or  powers  (to  make
laws) and  the authority to act directly in  the name of the state.
A new  environmental  law  or a  civil  rights  statute  or  an  in-
come tax are unusual examples of relatively major intrusions into
a world  where  other forces  create most  expectations  about how
other people and institutions must, may, or may not behave.  The
far more frequent  legislative  or judicial  tinkering with  relatively
narrow areas where there is disagreement about present norms or
powers  is,  when  compared  to  the  world  of expectations,  just
tinkering.
B.  Social Enforcement Devices
The role law plays in enforcing expectations  is also generally
exaggerated.  Divide the worlds of compliance-inducing  measures
somewhat  too sharply into  two:  the moral and the coercive.
Schooling,  training  by  parents  and  peers,  reading,  movies
and television-all of these not only convey  societal expectations
but, at the same time,  teach the rightness of acting in accordance
with  those  expectations.  That  is,  they  develop  and  direct  the
forces  of shame and guilt.  This teaching has little to do with law.
There is one very notable exception,  though.  No ethical message
is taught more passionately  and persistently in the United States
than the duty to respect and obey the law.  That means  that gov-
ernment,  whether  courts  or  legislature  or  executive,  has  the
power  to  bring conscience  and  training  to  bear as  a  device  for
enforcing  expectations  simply  by  anointing them  with the  oil  of
legitimacy and calling them "law."  (Something of the same magic
can, of course, also  be done in  the name  of patriotism.)
In the  realm of the  coercive sanctions,  social  pressures  may
be the most pervasive:  the threats of loss  of group acceptance  or
respect  and status.  Henry Hart  pointed out that the government
uses these as important threats associated with the criminal  sanc-
[Vol.  36: p. 191
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tion,'  but they more often operate without close ties to  law.  In a
somewhat related way, the expectations created in a long-term re-
lationship with a spouse,  a colleague, or even with a  supplier are
generally enforced by a threat of withdrawal ("exit") or by any of
a number of petty retaliations designed to remind the other of the
immense  capacity of each  to make  the  relationship  more or less
rewarding.
"Exit"  and  petty  retaliations  are just  two  of the  forms  of
"self-help"  that private individuals,  acting alone or organized into
groups, may bring to bear on another to enforce  or create an ex-
pectation about the other's conduct.  Strikes and boycotts are ob-
vious  additional  examples.  Again,  law  is  in  the  picture,  but not
central  to  self-help.  It  defines  what may  not be done  by  private
individuals  and thereby  defines what  may be done at least  if the
objective  is  acceptable.
Law  is  the  central  enforcement  device  only  when  govern-
ment, generally through the use of courts, threatens the use of its
power as well as its legitimacy to enforce  compliance or compen-
sation for noncompliance  and thus guarantees  the security of ex-
pectations.  Official  governmental  application  of legally  created
expectations  to fact situations-all the burdens  we assume in  the
form of adjudication  or administrative  decision-is  necessary  to
deal with three problems.  We use civil and criminal  sanctions to
enforce  expectations  that  are  being  willfully  disregarded.  I  will
sometimes  call  this  the problem of "bad  faith,"  although  it often
involves  willful  disregard  of expectations  that  were  not directly
created  by  some free and personal act.  We  also use tribunals  to
handle uncertainty-to resolve bonafide disagreements about what
is  expected  of whom  so  that parties  can  get  on with  their lives,
work and relationships,  knowing what to expect and yet not feel-
ing  that they  have  been made the victims  of extra-legal  obstina-
cies or self-help.  And, we use judicial review to deny effect to the
unauthorized  actions of government  officials.
My point, so far, is  this:  Actions  by elected  officials,  bureau-
crats or judges are important  sources of the creation  of social ex-
pectations  and of enforcement  of these expectations,  but they fall
far  short  of dominating  these  social  functions.  Law  generally
plays  a supplementary role in  societal arrangements.
1.  Hart,  The Aims  of the Criminal Law,  23  LAw  &  CONTEMP.  PROBLEMS  401,
404-05  (1958).
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IV.  THE  EFFECTS  ON  THE  DEMAND  FOR  LAWYERS'  SERVICES  OF
THE  PERVASIVENESS  AND  THE  EFFICIENCY  WITH  WHICH
RIGHTS  AND  REMEDIES  ARE  DEFINED  BY
GOVERNMENT
A.  Counselling
How  does  the  demand  for lawyers  vary  with  the extent  to
which law-as opposed to its social competitors-is used to create
normative  expectations?  The  answer  is  not  obvious.  Consider
first the question of counselling.  Of course, if there were no legal
rules  applicable  to  a particular  area  of human  behavior,  there
would be no need to hire lawyers to explain what they require and
the consequences  of disregarding them.  On the other hand, even
if there were a dense  network of rules regulating the area, coun-
selling by  a  lawyer  would  be unnecessary  if the  rules  were  well
understood.  Each state has a thick volume of rules of criminal law
and  so  does  the  federal  government;  yet ninety-nine  percent  of
the citizens are able to comply quite fully with these rules, without
legal  advice,  because  their  content  corresponds  so  closely  to  a
lifetime  of teaching in family,  school and private groups.
The  condition  that creates  a  demand for legal  assistance  in
the form of counselling  is one where clients are  aware that there
are,  or may be, rules  (1) that bear upon  their activities  in impor-
tant ways, and  (2) that they cannot themselves  find, understand or
apply  to  the  particular  situation.  In buying  counselling,  clients
pay for the  superior ability of the  lawyer  to predict what  people
are  required to do and are likely  to do in response to legally im-
posed and legally  enforceable  normative expectations.  The total
volume of law bears on this only as a greater total quantity makes
it  more  difficult  for  the  client  to  assimilate  legally  binding
expectations.
The  relationship  between  quantity  of law  and  the  need  for
lawyers  is complicated by the effects  of familiarity.  I  have already
mentioned  these effects in the context of traditional  criminal law.
There are also highly regulated areas where the pattern of regula-
tion  has  become  familiar  in  which  the  capacity of individuals  or
organizations to assimilate what is required is more than adequate
without having to turn regularly to lawyers.  Thus, over time, reg-
ulatory requirements in the environmental area have tended to be
handled first by law firms, then by counsel within the organization
and trade associations and, finally, by engineers and others within
the  firm.
200 [Vol.  36: p.  191
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B.  Dispute Resolution
The relationship between  the demand for the services of law-
yers in dispute resolution and the extent to which expectations in
a particular area of activity have been embodied  in law reflects  a
somewhat different pattern from that in counselling.  Problems of
dispute resolution  may arise either because one party is behaving
in bad faith, ignoring what he knows to be the obligation imposed
by law, or because  there is uncertainty  about the  meaning of the
law or the remedies it promises as applied to the factual situation.
There is  an  obvious relationship  between  the  demand for litiga-
tion  to enforce  good faith  compliance  and the  number of situa-
tions  in  which  the  law  offers  an  opportunity  to  require  some
action or restraint by taking another party to court.  Thus, the use
of litigation to deal with problems of bad faith increases  with  the
extent to which expectations  are made  legally binding.
Most  disputes  involve  uncertainty  rather  than  simply  bad
faith.  In these cases,  if the potential plaintiff and the prospective
defendant  (perhaps having the benefit of counselling by their law-
yers) have similar views about the expected value of the judgment
the  plaintiff may  obtain  from  litigation,  they  will  both  have  a
strong incentive to settle to avoid the additional cost of legal fees,
personal participation and disruption of relations.  Litigation will
only  arise, and  indeed lawyers  will only be used, when there  is a
substantial difference between the figures the plaintiff and the de-
fendant  get  when each  separately multiplies  his best  estimate  of
the remedy the plaintiff is likely to enjoy times the chance that the
plaintiff obtains that remedy.  Uncertainty about one of the ingre-
dients of this short formula is at the heart of the use of lawyers in
dispute resolution.
The demand for lawyers  in dispute resolution thus turns pri-
marily on whether the rules in a particular area are such that even
lawyers  find it difficult to predict what a court  will say they mean,
or to agree upon the facts that the rules make relevant, or perhaps
to predict how ajudge orjury will react to the picture produced at
trial.  While  counselling  is  most  in  demand  where  there  is  the
greatest difference between the ability of the lawyer and her client
to identify what  is  expected  and  to predict  the  consequences  of
these expectations,  the demand  for lawyers  in dispute resolution
generally  depends  upon  the difficulties  lawyers  themselves  have
in  making  reliable  predictions.  "More  law"  may  increase  or re-
duce  the  extent  of uncertainty  about  the meaning  of the  set of
legally created  expectations  relevant  to particular fact  situations.
1991]
11
Heymann: Considering the Costs and Benefits of Lawyering in Drafting Legis
Published by Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository, 1991VILLANOVA  LAW  REVIEW
There is no basis for concluding that new statements of what one
must or may not do will increase  litigation.
C.  A Summary
In short, the total quantity of law or regulation bears no very
direct relationship  to the need for lawyers except as  it creates un-
expected  or unclear  demands.  There  is  thus  much  room  to  be
skeptical  of the  argument that  the  way  to reduce  excessive  reli-
ance on lawyers  in our country is to reduce the amount of regula-
tion and taxation of individuals and organizations.  For one thing
there is generally a hidden agenda at work.  As a practical matter,
the primary and overriding issue in almost all cases  of regulation
and taxation is  the case for, or against, the particular interference
with individual  choice  or the propriety  of the particular  form  of
taxation.  The  cost  of lawyers  is  rarely  a  sufficient  ground  for
eliminating  what would otherwise be an appropriate governmen-
tal measure.
But beyond that, an emphasis  on the extent or pervasiveness
of law is  simply mistaken.  Certainly there is some foolish regula-
tion,  perhaps  much of it.  It is also  true that much regulation re-
quires  the  use  of lawyers  for counselling,  planning,  negotiation
and  adjudication.  But  it  is  the  novelty,  complexity  and  uncer-
tainty of the regulation or taxation, not its extent, that leads to the
use  of lawyers.  And,  in  many  cases,  regulation  (such  as  auto-
safety  rules)  may  reduce  the  need  for  lawyers  by  reducing  the
harms  (auto accidents)  that occasion litigation.
What most people mean  by "more  law"  is that more of what
individuals  or businesses  do is determined by judicial or political
choices  that take the form  of a demand  that someone  "must"  or
"may  not"  do something.  And what  most people  mean  by "less
law"  is that more of what happens  is  to be a result of judicial or
political choices that take the "may"  form, allowing individuals to
decide for themselves  what they will do with their property or in
their actions.  But on  a little  reflection  it becomes  clear  that the
uncertainty  which  requires  lawyers  is  only  sometimes  related to
whether  the  applicable  rules  require  or  forbid  certain  actions
rather than  leave the choice to an individual.
Lawyers  are  only  required  when  there  is  likely  to  be  some
form of interaction among  two or more  sets of individuals,  orga-
nizations  and  governmental  units.  Legal  assistance  is  only  re-
quired when there is some uncertainty as to what can be expected
of each.  When prohibitions  or requirements  are clear  and tradi-
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tional  (e.g.,  the  prohibitions  of theft  or murder),  there  is  little
need  of lawyers  although  they  take  the  "must"  or  "may  not"
forms.  On the other hand, when authorization or permission  has
a novel and ill-defined character-if others cannot  tell where the
"may"  begins  and  ends  in  a  confrontation  with  "may  not"  or
"must"-there will be a need for a third party resolution  and for
legal services.  For example,  a new permission to sell and use one
particular  form  of cocaine,  or  to  exclude  from  tax  a  particular
form of receipt or income, would spawn much new legal counsel-
ling and litigation.
It  is  true  that  there  is  often  greater  uncertainty  about  the
scope of regulation  or taxation than  about what one may do ab-
sent regulation.  But the greater uncertainty  is attributable to the
fact  that  the  regulation  or  taxation  is  assumed  to  be  relatively
novel and the freedom to act is assumed to be traditional and thus
within well-understood boundaries.  It is the background of famil-
iar custom that creates  more stable expectations,  not the form  of
law.  This  does  not mean  that new  laws  and  new  regulations  are
without special costs in terms of lawyers and judicial proceedings.
It simply means that these costs can be handled more logically as
part of the problem of uncertainty  and the task of better defining
legal  expectations.
D.  Economic Efficiency
It  is  also  true  that  the demand  for lawyers'  services  is  only
marginally  related  to  the  economic  efficiency  with  which  rights,
duties and liabilities are allocated.  Where individual responsibili-
ties are  clearly  located  for better or worse, we  create  an incentive
for  private  agreements  whenever  the  gain  to  the  parties  from
agreeing  to reallocate  their  rights and  responsibilities  is  greater
than  the  cost  of the  transactions  necessary  to  reallocate  them.
The result  of an  inefficient  allocation  of rights and  responsibili-
ties-the  very  definition  of an  inefficient  allocation-is  that  it
either requires too many such  transactions or stops desirable  ac-
tivity.  But  none of this  affects  the  number  of disputes.  And  it
bears on the use of lawyers for counselling only as  the increase in
the number of transactions may require more counselling services
in  the form of planning or negotiation.
1991]
13
Heymann: Considering the Costs and Benefits of Lawyering in Drafting Legis
Published by Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository, 1991VILLANOVA  LAW  REVIEW
V.  THE  CHOICES AS  TO  How  TO  DEFINE  LEGAL  RIGHTS  AND
REMEDIES  THAT  DETERMINE  THE  DEMAND  FOR  LEGAL
SERVICES
If it is  the  abstruseness  and unexpectedness  of some  of our
laws that create a demand for counselling, and if it  is the indeter-
minateness  of some  of our  laws  that  requires  professional  legal
help in  dispute resolution,  we are  in a  position  to ask when and
why  we  choose  or accept  those  qualities,  which  turn  out  to  be
costly in  terms of the fees for lawyers that they encourage,  in de-
fining legal rights and remedies.  We know that the answer is only
loosely connected  with  our views as  to  the desirability of regula-
tion  and even  with  our attitude  toward  efforts  to use  the  law  to
encourage  or duplicate  the results  of a market.  What  is  it then
that we buy with the qualities of unexpectedness  and abstruseness
and indeterminateness?
The object of addressing this question is to identify the more
ultimate trade-offs  that courts and legislatures  face when they ad-
dress  the definition  of new  rules  or remedies  and recognize  that
they are also, inevitably, affecting  the market demand for lawyers.
The  way legislative  and judicial  decisions  influence  the  demand
for lawyers  is  not immediately  apparent to them, nor is it gener-
ally the focus of their attention.  Intelligent choice requires  study-
ing  the  mechanisms  as  we  have  been  doing  and  making  more
salient  the  consequences  in  terms  of demand  for legal  services.
But,  in  the  final  analysis,  we  do  buy  something  when  we  define
rights  and remedies  in a  way that  creates  a  demand for  lawyers.
This  is not to suggest that  all is well.  Obviously  all is not well  in
the  legal  system  and,  equally  plainly,  important  choices  are  not
being  addressed.  But  if the  choices  were  seen  and  addressed,
they  would often be hard  to resolve.
Even  if one  were putting together  a new  society, much  like
ours,  but  with  the  considerable  freedom  to  change  the  way  we
conduct our affairs,  there would be a set of functions that lawyers
now perform  which most people would feel were still essential  in
a modern  society.  The society would  have  rules that created  im-
portant expectations.  First, someone  would  have to be responsi-
ble for  seeing that these  rules  were enforced  either by  public  or
private  litigation  and  that  they  were  not  enforced  improperly.
Second,  the creation of a structure of rules and the presence of a
set  of background  understandings  against  which  they  operate
would  generate  a  certain  demand  for  expertise  in  interpreting
what was  required  in particular situations.  The economy  of spe-
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cialization alone would mean  that there was  a need for those spe-
cialized  in  handling  the  complexity  and,  to  private  individuals,
novelty  of some  requirements  of law.  Abstruseness  and  unex-
pectedness  could  not be  completely  eliminated.  Third,  lawyers
would be needed  to resolve the indeterminacy about the applica-
tion  of law to particular fact  situations  where private parties  dis-
agreed  about  their rights,  duties  and remedies  even  if we  could
reduce  the  indeterminacy  considerably.  Finally,  legal  experts
would  be  useful  in  designing  rules  and  private  arrangements.
These  are  specialized  matters  in  a  modern,  sophisticated,  com-
plex economy  and society.
The question is not, therefore, whether one would want to do
away  with  all  the  lawyers  but  whether  we  are  making  sensible
choices  when we create the  conditions  that require more  lawyers
to perform one or more of these four functions.  In the most obvi-
ous  case  we  have  some  sense  of what  we  are  buying  (increased
accuracy  of factfinding  and a  richer  exploration  of how  the  law
should apply to those facts)  when we provide elaborate  adjudica-
tory  procedures.  And  of course  we  know  the  cost  in  terms  of
legal fees  and reduced  access  to those with small  stakes  who are
unable  to  fund  the  investment.  It  is  a  well  financed  and  bold
plaintiff who  sues  The  Washington Post, Time or CBS for libel.  We
have  at  least  a  sense of the cost in  terms  of counselling  fees  of
abstruseness  and unexpectedness  in our laws; but what do we buy
with these characteristics?  And what do we get for the increase in
demand  for litigating  services  that comes  with  indeterminacy  of
legal  rules?
A.  Counselling and the Abstruseness and Novelty  of Legal Rules
What  affects  the  demand  for  counselling?  More  than  ab-
struseness and novelty is involved.  Private  parties will seek coun-
selling  services  more  when  there  is  a  greater  chance  that there
will be an effort at enforcement of rules against them by private or
government  parties,  when  the  chance  of success  is  substantial,
and when the penalties, formal or informal, are greater if they fail
to  comply.  Counselling will be  called  upon  more  when there  is
no highly competitive alternative course of action which does not
require or benefit from legal advice.  Still, there are obvious legis-
lative and judicial choices  that go far toward  determining the de-
mand  for counselling.
There will be a greater demand for counselling if private par-
ties recognize that there is a substantial chance that a rule of regu-
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lation, taxation or subsidy may be applicable to their activities and
yet be  unknown  or unfamiliar  to them.  There  is  more need  for
counselling where  the meaning  of the  rules  is  new and  unclear.
Counselling will be more necessary when unusual forms of docu-
mentation or more complicated steps of compliance are necessary
to  bring  one  within  or  keep  one  without  the  scope  of a  rule.
Counselling will be more  necessary where  the interaction  of dif-
ferent rules or different  systems of rules is intricate.
At some cost to our other purposes we can always reduce the
need for counselling, as we can reduce the likelihood of litigation.
We  know  how; it is  simply  a  matter of choosing.  Only  here the
crucial  concept  is  not  "indeterminateness"  but  "abstruseness"
and "novelty."  The question here is what do we get in exchange
for novelty and abstruseness?  In large part, the answer is a capac-
ity to change social  expectations  by  government  choice.
Departing from the pattern of expectations that has been cre-
ated by custom, social morality, organizational mores, market de-
mands  and  ideology,  and  well-integrated  bodies  of  prior
legislation  and  decisions-i.e.,  deliberate,  governmental  chosen
social  change-automatically  creates  novel requirements  and lia-
bilities which are almost as surely esoteric or abstruse for a period
of time.
As an exercise in imagination, think of law-whether promul-
gated by courts, legislatures or executive officials-as if it were an
overlay on a background of custom and the demands of a modern
market  and  organizational  structure.  The  law  relates  to  what  I
have  defined  as  "the  background"  of normative  expectations
from other sources in two ways.  First, sometimes  the law  is used
to  reinforce  the  normative  expectations  created  by  that  back-
ground  by bringing the law's own moral legitimacy and its prom-
ise of coercion  to bear on their behalf.  Almost all of the criminal
law  takes this form  and so does much of contracts, property  and
torts.  Second,  in a dramatically  different  way legal expectations,
created  by  government,  are sometimes  used to overrule and dis-
place  custom  or  other  sources  of normative  expectations.  The
change may be a minor redefinition in an area where social expec-
tations  have been unclear, or an imposition of a unified set of ex-
pectations  on  an  area  of  cultural  diversity.  Or  it  may  be
something  still  more  dramatic:  a  political  rejection  of formerly
accepted traditions or a redefinition of the authority of some rival
form of social or economic control.  A major civil rights act falls in
this  category.
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The relationship between law and other sources of normative
expectations  has a  great deal  to do with  questions  going  to the
extent of the  use of lawyers  in  society.  Whatever social arrange-
ment has been long established has generally worked out the rela-
tionships  among  its  parts  in  a  relatively  predictable  and  stable
way.  I take that to be a law of nature.  Professor Lon Fuller made
much  of a  passage  where  Wittgenstein  notes  that  if I  ask  my
neighbor to teach my children how to play a game and he teaches
them a  gambling  game, I can meaningfully  exclaim that that  was
not the type of game I  meant,  although  neither of us ever con-
sciously considered the question. 2  An army of social messengers
told  my  neighbor  that  I  was  talking  about  something  else.  My
wife can accurately finish a sentence that I have hardly begun in a
way that no one else could.  Stability, meaning, predictability-all
of these grow rich with time and repetition.  Change is the parent
of uncertainty.  Novelty  gives birth to confusion.
To the extent that we use law  to change  the expectations  of
custom, organization  or the market  by granting  new permissions
or powers  or imposing  new  duties,  we  (i.e.,  government)  create
uncertainty  by  displacing  and  rending  the  rich  texture  of prior
understandings.  An overlay of new expectations  imposed by gov-
ernment creates  uncertainty  as  to how much of the old remains,
and uncertainty  as  to the meaning of the  new  terms  enacted  by
legislatures  or announced by courts.
The decisions that create a need for legal counselling may be
the byproducts  of far broader social change.  The departure from
prior expectations  may be occasioned by a shift in the moral judg-
ments of a large part  of the  population  (as with civil  rights after
the Second World War),  by a technological  development  such  as
the computer or the  videotape  player, by  the economic  implica-
tions of a  new  governmental  or regulatory  system  (Medicare  or
environmental  protection) or by  the development  of a new form
of organizational  structure,  securities  market or  business.  With
such changes  inevitably comes a requirement of altered  legal ex-
pressions  of normative  expectations  and  new  forms  of enforce-
ment.  The  altered  legal  structure  may  take  the  form  of new
statutes or new  interpretations of very general terms  of the Con-
stitution or legislation.  In all these cases, the expense of counsel-
ling cannot be far behind.
2.  See  L.  FULLER,  THE  MORALITY  OF  LAW  138-39  (rev.  ed.  1969);  see also  L.
WITTGENSTEIN,  PHILOSOPHICAL  INVESTIGATIONS  33  (G. Anscombe  trans.  3d ed.
1958).
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Uncertainty  is  the  price  we  pay,  for a  while,  when  govern-
ment purposely  changes  normative  expectations.  Uncertainty  is
also  the cost  of inviting  private individuals  and  organizations  to
undertake economic, social and political initiatives,  held together
by new legal  structures  and new,  self-created  systems  of norma-
tive expectations.  For this too it is necessary  to limit the reach  of
powerful  customary  normative  expectations  about  how  the  par-
ties must behave and how they should relate to each other, and to
come to understand the interaction of newly-created expectations
with the old.
B.  Dispute Resolution and Indeterminacy of Legal Rules
Consider now litigation and what it is that brings about situa-
tions  where  the  attorneys  for  two  parties  may  very  well  assess
quite differently  the expected  value of a judgment to the plaintiff
(i.e.,  situations  in  which  the  parties  are  likely  to  litigate  rather
than  settle).  These situations  have  one or more of three  charac-
teristics.  First, the meaning  of the law  may be relatively unclear
and  therefore  subject  to  debate  before  courts.  Second, the  law
may be clear  but worded  so  as  to turn on relatively  open-ended
questions  such  as  fault,  due  care,  the  best  interests  of a  child,
etc.-standards  that  invite  the  consideration  of  a  very  broad
range of facts and  the exclusion of very  few considerations  as ir-
relevant.  Third, the crucial facts may be unknown  to both parties
or,  almost  as  bad,  peculiarly  within  the  knowledge  of one.  In-
deed, the facts may involve matters that have to be explored  and
developed for the first time as part of litigation  (e.g., the share of
a  particular  market  that  a  company  involved  in  a  merger  will
enjoy).
At some  cost  in  terms  of our  substantive  purposes  and  the
refinement  with which we can tailor the law to their demands,  the
likelihood of litigation  can be reduced by rules that rely on famil-
iar concepts  and relationships,  that  sharply  limit  the  number  of
potentially  relevant  facts,  and  that  shape  results  around  factual
determinations  that are both  inexpensive  for each party  to make
and involve  facts accessible  to both parties.  We know, for exam-
ple, that insurance companies  settle minor accident  claims by re-
course  to  a  set of mechanical  rules,  one  of which  is  that  in  an
accident between  two cars going in the same direction the one in
the rear  is liable.  The rule  (a) uses  familiar concepts,  (b) sharply
limits the number of relevant facts, and  (c)  makes the results turn
on facts available at little  cost to both parties.
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At the opposite  extreme is  the rule of libel law that a public
figure can-only collect if he can show that defamation by the press
was intentional or grossly reckless.  The ultimate concepts are un-
familiar  and  not  used  in  other  contexts;  the  standard  of gross
recklessness opens a very wide  range of relevant factual  explora-
tion; the crucial facts are in the hands of only one party which has
no incentive  to share them.  The factual determination  is expen-
sive for the  press and  even more expensive for the plaintiff who
must extract the facts,  like a dentist pulling teeth  from an unwill-
ing patient,  by extensive  coercive  procedures.
Some  measure of indeterminacy  is  built into the  use of lan-
guage.  Ambiguity  about the application  of words  to factual  pat-
terns is  simply a fact of prescriptive language.  But we know how
to  reduce  indeterminacy.  Some  words  are  clearer  than  others,
and some concepts  are less difficult to apply consistently and pre-
dictably  to  factual  situations.  Finally,  we  have  some  power  to
choose the factual situation on which the applicability of a duty or
the availability of a remedy turns, and that may be a factual situa-
tion  more  or less open  to the  observation  of the  parties  to any
likely dispute.  So why do we create the conditions of costly inde-
terminacy?  Some  of the  reasons  are  clear;  two  are  of  central
importance.
First, there are great  benefits  to making our prescription  of
duties  correspond  to  familiar  moral  and  social  expectations.
Where  a  specification  of conduct  in  more  determinate  terms
would  necessarily  require omitting  many  of the  factors  that  are
considered  relevant  in  everyday  moral judgment,  we  must  con-
sider the costs  in acceptability  of the  law from defining expecta-
tions for legal  purposes  in a way  that is  out of line with general
moral judgments.
Rules that are applicable to large numbers of people who are,
in turn, expected to internalize normative expectations,  should be
simple  enough to be memorable  and should be, if possible, part
of a  coherent moral  structure.  The cost of this is  often  to make
liability or responsibility turn on the presence of facts unlikely to
be  inexpensively  available  to  both  parties,  thereby  assuring  ex-
pense and uncertainty in litigation.  If we want obligations to cor-
respond  to  moral  responsibility,  that  may  depend  on  what  the
defendant  was aware of and intended when he acted.  The prem-
ises of Western  morality  thus  provide  the  fertile  ground  for re-
quiring the plaintiff to undertake  costly  factual determinations  of
another's mind  and practices.
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The  second benefit  we  seek  with  indeterminate  rules  is,  of
course, more factually specific, richly contextualized decisions.  In
the context  of planned  transactions,  blunt but clear rules  can  fa-
cilitate agreements  by which the parties  can adjust  their expecta-
tions to the particular fact situation they are confronting.  Unless
a single resolution  of a particular indeterminacy  might avoid  the
need for many  transactions in  a number of future cases,  there  is
little to be gained from encouraging  the parties to involve a judge
in  shaping  their particular  responses  to  a very  specific  situation
for which they can plan and agree in advance.  But the situation  is
different when the transaction cannot be planned, as for example
in the  case of automobile accidents.
Some  factual  patterns  are  unanticipated  and  some  reflect
changes  in  the world.  Almost  by definition,  indeterminate  and
broadly purposive  or moral  terms are better able  to express  the
considerations we want a decisionmaker to bring to bear on unan-
ticipated  situations.  Determinate  language  says  nothing  about
unanticipated situations,  or it may  say the wrong thing.  Whether
indeterminacy lies in  the meaning of the legal concepts  or in the
range of facts  they  make relevant,  it often  reflects  a  decision  by
the legislature or court that promulgated the indeterminate man-
date  to  delegate  to another  decisionmaker,  operating  at  a  later
time and  in  a  far more  specific,  narrower context,  the  question
who  may,  may  not or must  do  something.  In  this  situation  we
create litigation as part of the very process  of deciding what nor-
mative expectations  are in the situation.  First the parties to a dis-
pute and then whoever  is called  upon  to resolve  it must address
their relations  in a highly specific  context where moral or purpo-
sive judgment can be  brought  to bear more  confidently  than  in
the abstraction  of the initial definition of the rule.  We  may also
seek the benefits of very focused argument as part of litigation.
VI.  CONCLUSION
I  have  sought  to identify  what  benefits  we  get  as  a  society
from those  decisions  of judges  and  politicians  that create  a  de-
mand for legal services.  But this pursuit may suggest too rational
a choice process.  In addressing this question one must not forget
that  some  of  the  costs  of  lawyering  are  incurred  because
lawmakers simply do not recognize the relationship between  their
choices and these costs,  and others  result from the political mus-
cle of those whose values or interests lead  them  to impose  these
costs  on others  willingly.
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There  is another,  deeper issue as well-a matter  of culture,
not politics or economics  or ignorance or self-interest.  It is fair to
ask whether we would have to worry about abstruseness,  novelty
and indeterminateness  if we were simply a people more respectful
of customary values.  Social attitudes matter in assessing the need
for lawyers.  Even  for planned transactions,  the amount of legal
assistance  required  obviously  varies  with  social  attitudes  toward
sharp dealing.  For the functions of dispute resolution  and coun-
selling, the demand for lawyers is very centrally a function of two
basic cultural variables:  the degree of uniformity of our social val-
ues  and  our  attitude  toward  violation  of customary  norms.  If
these were  different,  we  would hardly have  to attend  to how we
write our laws.  Let me explain why.
To  a  remarkable  extent, most  of us are  able  to comply  with
whatever  the  law expects of us without expert  help.  How is  this
possible without lawyers?  We  learn what is  expected  of us in the
form of social  norms in the rich variety of ways  I have described
earlier; we comply out of habit, belief and fear of non-legal social
sanctions; we use  the devices of self-help  to press for the compli-
ance  of others.  A need for lawyers doesn't arise because,  to  the
significant extent that the non-legal normative obligations  we take
seriously are broader and  fuller than  our legal obligations,  com-
pliance  with the former renders  legal  counselling  and  defensive
litigation unnecessary  even if the law is quite uncertain.  Thus the
law  relevant  to  our  obligations  and  remedies  may  be  abstruse,
novel, and indeterminate  without affecting  the need for lawyers.
In short, the demand for lawyers  is a function of the scope of, and
the extent of compliance with, familiar non-legal  norms as well as
of the extent of cognitive uncertainties  about legal rules and their
application to particular factual  settings.
I earlier invited the reader to picture the law as an overlay on
other forms of normative expectation, sometimes  coinciding with
those expectations  and sometimes  creating new expectations  that
go beyond the customary and familiar.  In fact, a realistic picture
would show that legal obligations are generally a smaller province
very  largely contained  within  a broader  country  of various  non-
legal  normative  expectations.  If one  avoids  crossing  the  wider
boundaries  and  violating  non-legal  normative  expectations,  one
will also generally avoid questions about whether one has crossed
the boundaries  of the province  and  thereby incurred  some legal
liability.,
Societies  differ  as  to  the  seriousness  with  which  they  look
1991]
21
Heymann: Considering the Costs and Benefits of Lawyering in Drafting Legis
Published by Villanova University School of Law Digital Repository, 1991VILLANOVA  LAW  REVIEW
upon  conduct that violates no legal rule but is widely considered
socially undesirable,  and they  differ as  to how  widely major seg-
ments  of the population accept the same  set of non-legal  norms.
The need for lawyers  is obviously a function of these differences
in  attitudes.  Where  non-legal  norms are very widely  shared and
socially enforced  with great determination, issues  as to the scope
of legal obligations  are  less likely  to arise.
The point is simply  this.  Both counselling and dispute reso-
lution disproportionately involve conduct occurring at the border
between an area of legal obligations and an area free of such obli-
gations.  If non-legal  devices  for  enforcing  normative  expecta-
tions  keep most people well away from this boundary  by keeping
them  beyond the more remote line that marks off what is socially
accepted  from  what is socially  disapproved, there  will be far  less
demand  for lawyers  for either counselling  or dispute resolution.
In societies  and in situations  where there is  no  effective sanction
against conduct  unless  it is  subject  to  civil or criminal  remedies,
the demand for lawyers  will be far greater.
Many in the United States do not want a society that strongly
encourages  uniform  social  norms and  is  quick  to condemn  and
impose social sanctions  on any violation of them-rather than fo-
cusing  its  social  condemnation,  as  we  now do,  on violations  of
law.  We have  come  to suspect  as  well as  value customary  struc-
tures  and  to value  as  well  as  respect  both  social  and  economic
entrepreneurs.
We  remember  that  segregation  in  the  United  States  was  a
customary norm,  and  custom once strongly supported  a terrible
indifference to long hours and low wages.  Sit-ins and strikes were
considered  by  many  to be  clear violations  of established  norms,
but we now celebrate  the triumph  of these initiatives  carried out
at the  borders of the law.  We recognize  a relationship  between
violating  customary norms and raising for political resolution  es-
sential  questions  about  our fundamental  understandings.  Simi-
larly,  customary norms may condemn the competitive imitator of
an unpatented improvement as a thief of ideas,  the price-cutter as
someone  indifferent  to  the  welfare  of  the  industry,  and  the
shrewd  speculator in  oil reserves  as  the scavenger  hoping to ex-
ploit general hardship  if the OPEC cartel tightens the screw.  But
we  also  recognize  that  these  activities  may  be  valuable  in  a  vi-
brant,  competitive  economy.
The  private  entrepreneurs  of  social  and  economic  change
frequently violate customary expectations.  Much of our constitu-
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tional law of free speech and freedom of religion has been  made
by such moral  adventurers.  They operate in the frontier area be-
yond  the boundaries where social condemnation begins but often
can keep themselves safely on the "right"  side of the limits set by
the boundaries  of legal obligation.  We recognize  that those who
are merely selfish and indifferent to the normative expectations  of
others also occupy that frontier area, but there is no way to shut it
off to the latter group without closing it to the group of social and
economic entrepreneurs  as well.
Societies  choose  the  weight  that they  will  give  to individual
freedom and that they will accord to the non-legal  normative  ex-
pectations of others.  Both are valuable.  A more conservative  so-
ciety  either  expands  the  province  of  legal  obligation  until  it
includes  almost  all of customary  moral  obligations  or uses non-
legal sanctions of a variety of sorts to render the area between law
and  customary  morality  uninhabitable.  A  more  daring  society
maintains  a  tentativeness  about  the  usefulness  of even  informal
sanctions within the frontier between moral and legal obligations.
And, whatever  a majority wants,  guarantees of freedom of associ-
ation,  freedom  of speech,  freedom  of religion  and  freedom  of
movement  may  go  far towards  creating  supportive  communities
which provide  sanctuary against  broader  social condemnation.
In sum, a final major condition of the demand for lawyers  in
the  United  States  is  a liberal  unwillingness  to blame  what  is  not
illegal  and  a  national  pluralism  that  provides  the  protection  of
greater or smaller communities against the social force of custom-
ary morality.  The result is that contests over what can and cannot
be done are far more  likely to take place along the boundaries  of
the legal, requiring the aid of lawyers in counselling and litigation
and making crucial the political choices  regarding  the amount of
indeterminacy,  abstruseness  and novelty  in our laws.
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APPENDIX  A
Since litigation  is a game where  one party's  gain is another's
loss,  each party's chance  of winning depends not  only upon  how
much she invests in persuasion about facts or law but also on how
much her opponent invests.  Consider the basic alternatives avail-
able to each party in this  regard:
(a)  to spend much  more than  the opponent does;
(b)  both to spend about the same amount and that to be
limited  to  what  the  parties  might  agree  on  in  ad-
vance recognizing  the costs of an "arms  race"  in liti-
gation expenses;
(c)  both to spend about the same amount but for that to
be much more than  in  (b); or
(d)  to spend much  less than the opponent  does.
When  the stakes  for both parties are high relative  to the  costs of
investment  in  persuasion,  each must often  rank the  alternatives,
from best to worst, as they are listed above:  outspending the op-
ponent, both spending little, both spending much,  and, worst of
all,  being badly  outspent  by the  opponent.
If each party decides that his wisest strategy for investment in
persuasion is to avoid the worst alternative,  (d), and seek the best,
(a),  the  result  is  that both  will  invest  heavily  without  either  en-
joying  the  advantage  that  each  sought  from  outspending  the
other.  Each  seeks  alternative  (a)  but both  get  (c).  Both would
have preferred  spending much  less and ending with (b).
The familiar  analogy  to this  process  is  that of an  arms  race
between  two nations.  The only conditions  this model of mutually
harmful behavior requires are that each side can see benefits from
making greater  "productive"  investments  than the other side  or
can  see great dangers from being left behind, and that there is no
very satisfactory  way for the parties to get together and agree, in a
way  that  each  can  rely  upon,  to  limit  their  total  expenditures.
These  conditions  apply  to  many  forms  of  strategic  weapons.
They  also apply  to  litigation  in many  situations.  But  they apply
most  damagingly  when  the  way  that  law  has  been  expressed
seems  to  offer  particularly  enticing  prospects  to  investment  in
persuasion.  So we return again to the central question:  when and
why  do  we  create  these  conditions  which  turn  out  to  impose
greater costs  of lawyering?
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As a new addition to the pages of the Villanova Law Review,  we
are pleased to present two outstanding briefs submitted by Villa-
nova  Law  School  students  in  moot  court competitions  in  1990.
Both  teams  brought  back  top  honors  in  their  respective
competitions.
The first brief is that of the winning team of the Domenick L.
Gabrielli  Family  Law Moot Court Competition  sponsored  by Al-
bany Law School of Union University.  This national competition,
held  in  March  1990,  focused  on  the  controversial  issue  of fetal
rights versus  maternal rights.
The second brief is that of the winning team in the Theodore
L. Reimel Moot Court Competition  sponsored by Villanova Uni-
versity  School  of  Law.  The  final  round  for  this  competition,
solely for Villanova  students,  was  also held  in  March  1990, and
centered  on  the  constitutional  and  equitable  issues  involved  in
the  disqualification  of homosexuals  from serving  in our nation's
military.
In  both  cases,  the  teams  from  Villanova  were  required  to
brief and argue the side for the appellants.  All facts contained in
both briefs were recited in the records prepared for the respective
competitions  and are  not reprinted  here for  the  sake of brevity.
The teams were judged on the quality of their legal writing as well
as  the caliber of their oral argument to  a panel of judges.
We  are  indeed  proud  of the  achievements  of  the  winning
teams and are equally proud to be able to reprint the product  of
their labors.
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